Epilogue: Leo Strauss and the History of Political Philosophy

The last chapter of History of Political Philosophy is Nathan Tarcov and Tomas L. Pangle’s epilogue on Strauss himself and why he wrote this book. First off, for Strauss, an understanding of the history of political philosophy was necessary to understand the present crisis of both the West and as well as modernity. The greatest symbol of this crisis was the rise of communism, which Strauss saw as both a form of Western political theory and a form of Eastern despotism. Strauss was also concerned with the loss of the West’s faith in its ability to bring about a universal and free order, which Strauss saw as bringing back the pluralism of cultures and the belief in natural inequality of the ancients. This means that the West had to defeat its own doubt and growing belief in various forms of relativism. Thus, while the limits and problems of liberalism can be recognized, these are not to be seen as fatal to the liberal project as even worse problems have arisen out of the destruction of the liberal state such as communism and fascism.

Strauss saw the study of history as particularly important as for him, the root of the modern crisis is historicism. By studying history, Strauss feels that the problems of historicism will emerge. Still, Strauss still thought that that the past must be understood on its own grounds, a move which Strauss hopes will avoid what he sees as the pitfalls of both historicism as well as historical progressivism. Understanding a historical figure on their own grounds means that a person try and recreate the framework the historical figure was using which includes both terminology and influences.

Strauss also sees philosophers as having a responsibility to investigate without damaging the basic liberal order, which he sees as being greatly tied up in the origins of modernity. For Strauss, the roots of modern political philosophy are to be found in Machiavelli as this is where a shift occurred from having a purely theoretical conception of the right order to trying to actualize it and with this, the birth of the idea of historical progress. According to Strauss, modernity’s belief in a false notion of progress would eventually give birth to the idealization of the past from Rousseau and Nietzsche. Strauss looked to the ancients and the medieval philosophers who followed them for inspiration, but he also realized that their basic ideas must be reformulated.

Following from them, Strauss also placed great emphasis on the political life and looked to it as proof of humans’ place in nature as a social animal. The social nature of humans though is for Strauss rooted more in the idea of the common good than in cold calculation. Through this, Strauss hopes to establish a meaning to society beyond political necessity. A natural understating of the basis of power will develop from this which will help humans fully flourish. Strauss further sees the philosopher as being able to comprehend human problems and the human experience as a whole and thus the true philosopher, as opposed to the Sophist must have a sense of the dialectic.

Strauss was a supporter of liberal democracy, but he was not a flatterer of it. He also tried to inject a degree of classical republicanism into modern republicanism. Despite his aim to inject an ancient understanding into modernity, Strauss thought the ancients were to be admired for their philosophy, not for their social and political order. Modern liberalism is also to be valued as a means, not as an end. What this means is that freedom in a liberal order must not be understood in such a way that it threatens the modern liberal order itself. Social science must be utilized for the understanding and solving the problems of the liberal order and must ultimately protect it. This means that for Strauss, both the fact/value dichotomy and the notion of “value-free” science must be rejected. Likewise, all political science must also focus on the protection of the liberal order. Political scientists must also therefore focus on studying the other types of regimes in the world in order to come to a more robust understanding of them. This should be used to engage in debate with supporters of the other styles of regimes. This is particularly true of the Marxists which Strauss hopes to use this dialogue between the supporters of the liberal order and the supporters of the Marxist order in an effort to understand the Marxist paradigm which Strauss hopes to use to defend the basic superiority of liberalism over Marxism.           

Martin Heidegger

Michael Gillespie provides the essay on the last philosopher covered in History of Political Philosophy, Martin Heidegger, who is perhaps the most controversial philosopher covered in the book due to his association with Nazism. For Gillespie, Heidegger was the first philosopher since Plato and Aristotle to seriously consider the idea of Being. It needs to be noted that Heidegger claimed his thought had no political bearings, but despite this he can still be called a political philosopher because of his affiliation with Nazism, which bears some discussion and more importantly, because of his concern with nihilism.

In particular, Heidegger was concerned with the idea of metaphysical nihilism as this did away with the ground of Being and through this idea, there could be no absolute truth. An outgrowth of metaphysical nihilism is moral nihilism which does away with fundamental moral laws. Heidegger sees two possible consequences of moral nihilism. The first of these consequences is banal hedonism. The second of these consequences of these consequences is the destructive desire to destroy everything. This is important because for Heidegger, at the root of nihilism was a misunderstanding of the idea of Being. This misunderstanding is itself rooted in the Platonic conception of Being as eternal presence. While the growth of nihilism might be a disaster, it can also be used to lay the foundation for a new foundation of the conception of Being that better understands the nature of Being. For Heidegger, Being cannot be simply understood unchanging, but must be viewed in history as Being in history.

The fact that humans have a conception of the question of Being is for Heidegger proof that Being is not set as an acorn has no question of becoming a tree. Being is thus not a question of what man is, but rather of how he exists. The question of Being fundamentally arises with the human confrontation with death as typically people simply blend in with the order of Being. Death though forces people to come into contact with questions concerning the nature of Being. This is important as Heidegger’s belief in a revolution in thought to reformulate the notion of Being caused him to look towards the Nazi party as a way of attaining this goal. It should be noted that he was never completely on board with the Nazi program as he thought that this should be done while maintaining the independence of the German university, which the Nazi government would not do.

Still, Heidegger had great hopes that the Nazi party could help reformulate modern humanity, which Heidegger saw as being too fundamentally tied up in technology. This dependency on technology has radically isolated the individual, separating the individual from a greater order. As a result of this, nature becomes seen as an other. From this, further division is created and conflict becomes more prevalent. This is an important point as Heidegger sees technological thinking as being fundamentally tied up in the act of thinking in categories. Realizing there is now a risk of floating off into nothingness due to this misunderstanding of Being, modern humans have turned to using history as an anchor to know oneself. From this has risen the entirety of historicist thinking.

Heidegger identifies three main ideologies of late modernity. These three ideologies are as follows: 1) Americanism, 2) Marxism, and 3) Nazism. Heidegger sees all three as being part of a subjectivist and nihilistic understanding that leads to the dictatorship of the public over the private and the elevation of natural science, economics, public policy, and technology. Despite these commonalities between these three ideologies, Heidegger is also careful to make note of the differences that exist between them. For example, Heidegger sees Americanism as being tied up in positivism, the industrial complex, and the elevation of economics and planning which organizes through the labor of the common person and rules through the market. Meanwhile, Heidegger sees Marxism as the product of humans being socially reduced. Interestingly enough, Nazism is seen as the most nihilistic form of modernity as it replaces reason with instinct and reduces all to a beast.

For Heidegger, the pre-Socratic Greeks were right to understand Being as a mystery and also to see the polis as the place where the gods and men met. Socrates also understood this through his use of the dialectic, so the real break begins with Plato and Aristotle. It is from this break that reductionist thinking, particularly in science was created. Heidegger is deeply concerned with the effects of reductionistic thinking, so much so that he also seeks to undo the traditional way of understanding history as for Heidegger history is not to be understood as a chain of events, but rather the destiny of Being itself. Still, it should be noted that Heidegger does not seek an overthrow of Being as much as he thinks it should be reinterpreted. Through this, Heidegger has essentially three goals. These three goals are as follows: 1) liberating man from all metaphysical categories and standards through a fundamental destructive reinterpretation of the history of Western thought; 2) fostering an authentic experience of contemporary nihilism by calling man to a resolute confrontation with death and meaninglessness; and 3) convincing man to accept his particular fate within the destiny of his people or generation made manifest in the revelation of Being.                         

Edmund Husserl

Coming in as one of the last entries to Strauss and Cropsey’s History of Political Philosophy, Richard Valkley examines the thought of Edmund Husserl. Firstly, Valkley notes that in many ways, Husserl is an odd choice to have an essay devoted to him in a book about political philosophy as he makes no commentary on political matters. However, Husserl’s conception of the telos can have many important political implications, particularly as it relates to full autonomy as a human goal. This relates to Husserl’s search for new grounds in rationality. This is politically important as he sees reason’s essence as being absolute autonomy. These aspects of Husserl’s thought are important for three reasons. These reasons are as follows: 1) it provides a notion of rationality as essentially normative and sees the task of “rescuing” rationality to be in the service of the human good. 2) It proposes a critique of positivism (or, as Husserl prefers, “psychologicalism”) and historicism which are of course immediately relevant to political science. And finally 3) it engages in a close examination of the inherited premises of the philosophic tradition, an examination that has provided an impetus to fundamental historical inquiries into the sense of the Greek beginnings and the early modern “foundations” of philosophy.

            One of the most important aspects of Husserl’s thought is phenomenology and while he is not the first phenomenologist, his phenomenology is important for two reasons. These reasons are as follows: 1) The science of phenomenology must be without presuppositions in order to create proper grounding for human ideas and 2) The science of phenomenology is the first philosophy and the foundation for all sciences. Indeed, all 20^th century phenomenologists owe something to Husserl is if not all of them fully accept his arguments.

This relates closely to Husserl’s understanding of modernity as for him, modernity is in a crisis of self-understanding and this crisis has brought us to the edge of collapse and barbarism. As such, a new telos is needed which will better conceptualize the idea of reason as autonomy. This also relates to a common criticism of Husserl in that while he claims that thought must be without presuppositions, his own thought ultimately falls into its own presuppositions. Valkey however sees this criticism as not being entirely convincing as fist off, he notes that Husserl’s emphasis on reason causes him to place more importance on human essence than on human nature. Husserl also places a greater emphasis on the relationship between reason and the surrounding world than was done in antiquity.

Furthermore, Husserl also sees the telos as being grounded in history, but separates this from historicism, an idea which he rejects. Husserl also spends a good deal of time developing a critique of psychologicalism, the idea that all human knowledge is rooted in the functions of the brain, which he sees has having two fundamental errors. These errors are as follows: 1) it falls into naturalism by trying to understand the human mind in the same way as physical objects are understood and 2) there is an attempt to create a foundation for all of human knowledge within the confines of these principles and thus falls into relativism. In a way, Husserl is trying to bridge Descartes’ gap between the mind and objects as while physical objects are very real, they are connected together and given meaning in our minds.

Husserl’s radical ideas on autonomy also keeps him from falling into another danger, that of “commonsense realism.” Husserl accepts absolute reason, but understands that humans tend to conceptualize this pure reason through their surroundings. This can be seen in Husserl’s writings on historicism Husserl rejects historicism as he sees it as damaging truth as “truth” always becomes dependent upon the particular age in which it exists. In Husserl’s view, fact must be independent of worldview and philosophy’s scientific impulses must be restrained. This is important as through the modern attempt to closely identify reason with science, the attempt to free humans from science has become transformed into an attempt to free humanity from reason. As such, Husserl understands that understanding worldview is important, but does not want to place philosophy under worldview, which he sees historicism as being guilty of doing.

Husserl sees phenomenology as being better able to make us aware of our own presuppositions. Philosophy in its purest form is without presuppositions, but in order for it to be understood it must be brought down to earth where it will lose some of its purity. As such history has a place in philosophy but cannot be its master. Instead, the telos must be the ultimate guide and indeed, true philosophy must be primarily concerned with comprehending the telos. This is important as for Husserl, the rejection of the telos, particularly as it relates to falsification, has created a major crisis in the West. The rejection of the telos makes manipulation easier and this leads Husserl to place great emphasis on mathematics as the mathematization pf other fields have made them easier to manipulate and thus we must be careful with its use, particularly in relation to philosophy.             

John Dewey

As Strauss and Cropsey’s History of Political Philosophy nears the end, it now turns to Robert Horwitz’s take on John Dewey, who is one of the few Americans to have a place in Strauss and Cropsey’s book. According to Horwitz, one of the elements of Dewey’s thought that is most important to remember is his focus on democracy. Indeed, according to Horwitz, Dewey is a philosopher of democracy and for him; democracy must be realized in every element of life. As such, Dewey’s political philosophy expands beyond the state and makes comment on ethics, education, logic, esthetics, and many other fields in an attempt to understand these things within a democratic framework.

Horwitz goes on to explain that Dewey had three major goals. These goals are as follows: 1) make philosophical investigation relevant to the solutions of contemporary social problems, 2) develop the “method of intelligence” as the chief tool for finding the solution to these problems, and 3) a development of a political theory based on an evolutionary understanding of people and society. Dewey is a particularist who thinks political philosophy must be understood within the confines of the particular society in which it is found. Not surprisingly then, considering he’s writing in the United States during the late 19^th century, class division is a major theme in Dewey’s work and Dewey agrees with many of Marx’s criticisms of capitalism. Dewey however breaks with Marx on the question of what to do with these problems of capitalism as while Marx thought revolution was the answer, Dewey places emphasis on social progress. Social progress is a major theme for Dewey and for Dewey; this social progress must be based in experimentation. For Dewey, the focus on experimentation should lead to an investigation of our institutions. This is important because social problems rise with our institutions no linger match the society in which they exist. Democracy is seen as aiding in the realization of Dewey’s experimentalist goals.

Experimantalization is also important because it is seen as a way of establishing objective truth. Dewey though does realize that it will be difficult to establish objectivity on political, economic, and ethical matters, but thinks that a careful consequentialist approach can solve these problems. Dewey uses Darwin to conceptualize philosophy as going through constant change and as such rejects the idea of fixed species and fixed end. Above all, Dewey seeks growth in philosophy which creates a relativistic understanding within a universalist framework.

Dewey’s philosophy can be understood as falling under two headings. These headings are as follows: 1) a modified pluralistic understanding of society and 2) the “indirect consequence” test for defining the legitimate scope of the state. On heading 1), modified pluralism, Dewey bases this on the idea that humans need society in order to facilitate growth. The simple, local society is the first society and as these societies grow and become more complex they begin to interact with one another. Once this happens, the need for regulation is created in order to provide a way of settling disputes. This means for Dewey, the state will always remain a secondary institution. Dewey likes that pluralism restrains the state from abusing its citizens, but thinks that traditional pluralism reduces the state to playing the role of an umpire. This is an error as Dewey thinks the state should be able to make positive contributions. Dewey’s state can promote positive characteristics and restrain negative ones more easily, such as restraining some of the excesses of capitalism as well as providing some protection to workers. This means pluralism has its limits and destructive groups, groups that refuse to recognize pluralism themselves are not given protection from pluralism. Groups that inhibit growth also are not given protection from pluralism.

In order to provide for all citizens, must grow and this creates the danger of that state becoming totalitarian. Dewey though addresses this concern through his second heading, the indirect consequence test. This requires that indirect consequences be carefully considered and controlled for as Dewey sees the public as being the recipient of these indirect consequences. Democracy is the major way in which Dewey controls for these consequences and as such, it is highly important that the public at large is both aware of and considers these consequences. Therefore, Dewey’s public must be good democrats and be willing to cooperate with one another as democracy forms the foundation for Dewey’s idea of a good order. As such, Dewey’s solution to the problems of democracy is more democracy.             

Friedrich Nietzsche

The next entry in Strauss and Cropsey’s History of Political Philosophy is Werner J. Dannhauser’s take on the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, who is perhaps one of the most original philosophers featured in the book. Dannhauser begins his essay by first examining the thought of the young Nietzsche. At this point in his life, Nietzsche saw the philosopher as being the physician of culture and was supposed to diagnose a problem with the culture and then search for a cure. Initially, Nietzsche saw this cure as being found in music. Eventually, Nietzsche lost faith that music could produce a cure for the problems of a culture and began to search for other ways to achieve this task. This search preoccupied most of the rest of his life and for Dannhauser; Nietzsche would most fully articulate this search in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

One of the major problems Nietzsche saw in modern philosophy was its dependency on historicism and a belief in world progress. According to Nietzsche, both this problems largely laid at the feet of Hegel. Humans are seen as historical creatures because they can remember the past, and it is this that both makes humans fully human and also slaves. Therefore, according to Nietzsche, the task before us is to strike a balance between remembering and forgetting the past. Nietzsche does not want to do way with history, as he sees it has great value. In particular, Nietzsche thinks that there are three types of history that can serve life. These three types of history are as follows: 1) Monumental history provides the man of action with models of greatness by its depiction of the great men of the past, 2) Antiquarian history addresses itself to the preserving and revering element in man, imbuing him with salutary love of tradition, and finally 3) Critical history, which places obsolete aspects of the past before the bar of judgment and condemns them and by doing this, it brings to light injustices surviving from the past so that they can be abolished in the present. Still, even though Nietzsche sees positive aspects to these three types of history, he also sees ways in which all three are open to abuse. For example, Monumental history may hinder the development of present greatness while Antiquarian history may preserve current injustices. Critical history can also be abused as it can separate people from their past.

Historical science is seen as disrupting life as it places more emphasis on the desire to know than on the desire to serve life. Connected to this is Nietzsche’s idea that Hegel has removed the challenge of dealing with calamites from the historical process. Furthermore, for Nietzsche, a major failing of historicism was that it placed man below history and with this; it also placed wisdom over life. Nietzsche was this as a problem because for him, life should be placed above wisdom. This is not to say Nietzsche wants to do away with wisdom as his ultimate goal is to actualize what he sees as a unity between wisdom and life. Nietzsche also thinks that history should be viewed as being made by great men. Because of this, for Nietzsche there is no objective history, but rather only interpretations of historical facts. History must be viewed as being entirely man made. The ancient Greek civilization understood this and is viewed as the height of humanity due to their emphasis on master morality and conflict. And just as the ancient Greeks are seen as the height of humanity, Greek tragedy is seen as the height of ancient Greek civilization.  

Socrates however is seen as initiating the beginning the fall of this civilization, a trend that was further developed with the rise of Christianity and with that, the triumph of slave morality. What Nietzsche means by “master/ slave morality” is that all morality involves the imposing of values, a fact that master morality fully understands, accepts, and embraces. Slave morality rejects this and thus tries to elevate the weak. Despite Nietzsche’s contention that pagan societies, particularly the ancient Greek one, understood the true nature of morality better, it should not be inferred from this that Nietzsche is seeking a restoration of pre-Christian morality. Rather, Nietzsche’s goal here is to create a reformulated version of master morality.

Slave morality as rooted in Christianity has also brought with it other egalitarian movements such as democracy and socialism. This is greatly troublesome for Nietzsche as he feels that this will bring about the triumph of mediocrity. The attack on democracy and socialism also ties closely in with Nietzsche’s contention that modern society, far from destroying the old idols like they thought that had, merely produced new idols to replace the old ones. And much like the old idols if the past, these new idols must be destroyed. Needless to say, Nietzsche is indeed an atheist, but his atheism is atypical from the rest of the atheism of the day in three major ways. These ways are as follows: 1) it is explicitly stated, 2) it is of the political right and rooted in aristocracy, and 3) it is historical. All this ties into the idea of the Death of God and with that the realization that God and morality are the products of human creation. Though he is a staunch critic of the left, Nietzsche rejects conservatism for four major reasons. These reasons are as follows: 1) It has been forces to make concessions, 2) it embraces nationalism, 3) it relies on the old nobility, and 4) it is allied with Christianity.

What all this means is that initially, only decline can happen, but from this decline and collapse a better order will be able to emerge. The highest goal in life then is seen as the ability to enact the will to power and overcome problems, a move which leads Nietzsche to see humans as primarily being a creative being rather than a rational one. Nietzsche’s radicalization of human will and creativity creates a problem as it creates a question as to if all problems could ever be overcome and what would happen if this ever was the case. Nietzsche’s ideal on this radicalization is what he calls the Übermensch,[1] an absolutely creative and unique individual, a move that shows Nietzsche’s indebtedness to radical individualism. In the last part of the essay, Dannhauser addresses the most controversial aspect of Nietzsche’s thought, his supposed connection to Nazism. Here Dannhauser notes that while Nietzsche abhorred the nationalism, racism and anti-Semitism of what would later become fascism, his ideas on the radicalization of creativity and his anti-egalitarian Übermensch did indeed help lay the groundwork for the development of fascism.      

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[1] The essay actually uses the term “Superman”, an older translation of Nietzsche’s term that is now rejected as inaccurate by virtually all Nietzsche scholars.  

Karl Marx

For his second entry in History of Political Philosophy, Joseph Cropsey turns his attention to Karl Marx, one of the most radical philosophers in the book. For Cropsey, Marxism must be seen as an account of human life in past, present in future as grounded in continuous change. Furthermore, Cropsey notes that Marx sees economics as the foundation for all of society, so to understand economics is to understand society. Because of this, humans must be understood as empirical creatures attempting to fulfill their biological and economic needs.

Humanity’s economic conditions are determined by the tools they have available. These tools create the conditions that determine the prevailing property relations. These property relations create social relations that create a division between the people who own the means of production and those who work the means of production. Thus, for Marx economic “laws” are not really laws as they are a product of the particular economic conditions of the historical period in which they exist. Marx does not merely think this about economics either as for him all of human thought is grounded in the particular historical period they inhabit. Every historical period has been divided between the workers and owners and it is this conflict that drives the historical process as the workers have been prevented from becoming fully human. For Marx, these divisions are rooted in in natural inequality in the distribution of talent.

Marx also sees civil society as an outgrowth of the fractioning of society as civil society works as an individualistic oasis against the community. For Marx, this is a highly negative aspect as for Marx, people’s status as a social creature demands that institutions be public. But because this is not the case, a badly divided society forms which needs coercion in order to stay together. According to Marx, this is where the state comes from. Because of this, people are discouraged to work with each other. In order to solve this problem, a proper alignment of the means of production are needed in order to bring people together. Under current conditions however, other people are seen as more of a product than as full human beings.

Marx takes a dim view of much of what made of the discipline of political economy of his day. This is because for Marx, as economics are rooted in the particular historical period it exists in, political economy is essentially a tool for the ruling class. Marx sees society as being in constant flux and sees this flux as being grounded in the material conditions. Marx calls this process dialectical materialism. According to Marx, all of history is governed by this process. This process will eventually bring about the end of capitalism as machinery will become more and more developed, but under private ownership the lives of the workers will become worse and worse. As a result of this process a revolution will eventually occur which will bring about the end of capitalism. Once this has occurred, the workers will abolish private ownership and with that, the class system. This move will mark the beginning of purely human history. Marx says that the workers will establish socialism, but he does not explain how socialism will work because he saw his main task as offering a critique of capitalism.  

One of the most significant contributions Marx made to political philosophy is his work on value. For Marx, the capitalist concept of profit distorted true value as value is grounded in labor. Marx saw a distinction between value in use and value in exchange with value in exchange producing distortions if value in use. Without these distortions, labor could be more properly seen as the basis of value. Under capitalism however, these distortions are inevitable as capitalism a turned labor power into a commodity. This is because there is, under capitalism, a discrepancy between the amount of labor done and the amount of labor paid for. This creates a surplus which the capitalists take. Capitalists have an incentive to increase this discrepancy, primarily by pushing the use of machines that cause more pauperization. Because of this push towards the greater use of machinery, capitalism must be in ever increasing flux to survive. Marx sees this as the natural process of capitalism, and because of this, the bourgeois (middle class) will become proletarianized (working class) while the proletariat is reduced to poverty.

Marx’s predictions on capitalism have not panned out while his predictions on socialism have not been falsifiable as every existing socialist society has claimed to be in a state of transition. Still, under socialism Marx thinks that people will achieve the ancient ideal of the active man. Because of this, Marx sees socialism as people’s highest calling. It should be noted, that whatever faults Marx has, one of the most important parts of his legacy is his unwillingness to make peace with the currently existing order as many of those who came before him did. For Marx, people may be imperfect, but it that imperfection that moves history towards to perfection of humans and Marx sees this desire as having very old roots as in many ways, Marx sees socialism as being the actualization of religious longing for justice to correct currently existing injustice.         

John Stuart Mill

The next entry to History of Political Philosophy is Henry M. Magid’s essay on John Stuart Mill, one of the most important philosophers of the liberal order during the 19^th century and son of James Mill. One of the most important things to remember about Mill is that while he is a utilitarian like his father, he attempted to make several major reforms to that system. In particular, Mill wanted to present a broader view of the basis of human action in utilitarianism. This was done in order to address Macaulay’s critique of utilitarianism that saw utilitarianism in error because it presented an overly simplistic conception of human action that grounded it entirely in the desire for behavior. For Mill, Macaulay’s critique of utilitarianism should lead to a reform of the system, not its overthrow.

            One of the more important aspects of Mill’s thought is his writing on epistemology. For Mill, there are three kinds of deduction. These are as follows: 1) direct, 2) concrete, and 3) inverse. Because of this, there are four methods of gaining knowledge, all of which are seen as concrete even though they are applicable to different service matters. These four methods are as follows: 1) induction proper,  which Mill calls the Chemical method and establishes causal laws by comparing specifically observed cases using the cannons of induction; 2) direct deduction, which Mill calls the Geometric method and argues by syllogistic reasoning from first principles to less general laws; 3) concrete deduction, which Mill calls the Physical method and infers the laws of effects not from one causal law, but from a number of the, taken together and considers all the causes which influence the effect and comparing their laws with one another; and finally 4) inverse deduction, which Mill calls the Historical method and develops empirical laws of society on the basis if induction and then to “verify” those laws by deducing them from the a priori laws of human nature.

            Mill then goes on to state that there two branches of social science and both are needed in order to complete social science. These two branches are as follows: 1) the first branch supposes that conditions remain the same, but that new are different factors or agents are introduced. Political Economy is included in this first branch. 2) The second branch addresses how the conditions themselves change. The Philosophy of History is included in the second branch. Mill also sees the Philosophy of History as being important as it helps humans understand and make progress. This is important as Mill sees progress and possible and desirable but rejects the notion that progress is inevitable. The Philosophy of History also ties into the young Mill’s idea of there being two basic stages of society. These stages are as follows: 1) the natural state where those best fit to govern actually govern and 2) the transitional state where someone other than those best fit to govern actually govern.

            It should also be noted that Mill has an idealistic as opposed to materialistic conception of social progress, which leads him to see a society’s intellect and scientific progress as a sign of advancement. This is important as in his moral theory Mill accepts basic utilitarian assumptions but attempts to reformulate them in order to present a picture of humans as being elevated from animals. With this move, Mill elevates intellectual pleasure over physical pleasure. There are three connections between this and Mill’s political philosophy. These connections are as follows: 1) a society in which people peruse higher pleasures is seen as superior to a society in which people pursue lower pleasures; 2) the move towards higher pleasures requires freedom, so only free societies can be truly civilized; and 3) the pursuit of higher pleasures leads to higher human achievement.

            Mill takes a new path on the government by convention/ government by nature debate as he see both approached unsatisfactory as if government is made purely by convention than unlimited choice is possible, but if government is made by nature, then no choice is possible. For Mill, government is to bring about the order that helps move progress along. Furthermore, the distinction between progress and order is rooted in the two natures of humans. Government though is not merely to enforce order, but is also to create the conditions needed to bring about progress such as education.

 This focus on progress leads Mill to two options in forming the best government. These options are as follows: 1) representative democracy and 2) benevolent despot. Though Mill thinks it’s possible for a benevolent despot to form the best government, he ultimately finds such a situation unlikely due to nature and the lessons of history. Thus, the only real option for Mill is representative democracy, but to this is makes several key changes on how this is to function. Mill does not want the elected representative to govern, but rather is looks to technocratic experts to do this, while ultimate ruling authority still resides in the democratic process. In sort, the people elect their representatives who in turn chose the technocratic experts to run the government. For Mill, it is essential to create a balance between the governing body and the representative body as too powerful of a representative body may lack the talent to properly govern, a problem that Mill sees as being inherent in monarchy and aristocracy. Likewise, too powerful of a governing body can suppress freedom. 

For Mill, the more traditional, majoritarian conception of democracy can devolve into tyranny of the majority. Because of this, each part of society must be equally represented. Because Mill rejects the inevitability of progress, representative democracy is seen as the best form of government but is not a utopia. Furthermore, representative democracy faces a constant threat of regression. It is also only for more advanced civilizations as for Mill, his theory of liberty is only applicable to higher levels of civilization. In this, liberty is conceived in a practical, consequentialist as liberty is valued because it is best able to promote happiness of the individual. This is not so say liberty is to be unlimited as Mill recognizes there needs to be some limits on liberty as abstract noninterference with individuals can only promote anarchy. This though only applies to actions as thought and expression are both grated absolute freedom. Freedom of discussion though requires that all participants play by certain rules in order to create a more robust conception of discussion. For Mill as a general rule, restrictions on freedoms should be not implemented in so far as the action in question causes no harm to others.     

Alexis De Tocqueville

The next entry to History of Political Philosophy is Marvin Zetterbaum’s essay on Alexis De Tocqueville, one of the first philosophers to fully address the American experiment. Though included in History of Political Philosophy and very much a philosopher in the lose sense, Tocqueville is also an early sociologists, rooting his study of politics on what the effects democracy as a first principle as well as social conditions had on a people. Tocqueville’s focus on social conditions, though not a master key to understand society is still a highly important aspect of this task. Social conditions and first principles are deeply connected as in democratic societies, the social condition regards equality as a first principle. Humans have the power to determine the first principles of the society they live in, but not the outcome of these conditions. This is important as it suggests that Tocqueville is neither a hard determinist nor a metaphysical libertarian. There is also some elements of historical inevitability here as Tocqueville sees democracy as eventually triumphing over slavery.

One thing that should be noted though is that even though democracy has equality as a first principle, this is not an absolute equality of material conditions. Rather, what is meant by “equality” here is legal equality. It is also important to remember that Tocqueville is not completely uncritical of democracy has he does see atomism, the dislocation of individuals from society as a possible effect of democracy. This ties in closely with what Tocqueville identifies as the three codes of a class-based society democracy has over turned. These three codes are as follows: 1)The barriers separating the classes have been toppled, 2) Property has been divided and equalized, and 3) new centers of social, intellectual, and political achievement have been opened to all. For all the problems class-based societies had, they were able to maintain great social bonds, but the loss of these aspects of class-based society under democracy have caused a loss of these social bonds. Because society cannot last for long without some social bonds, democratic societies must reformulate these bonds under a new democratic framework. This needs to be done as atomization runs the risk of people falling into self-absorption which will itself lead to mediocrity and soft tyranny. Another possible development of atomization is that people may begin to live without constraints.      

Overall though, Tocqueville does have a positive perception of democracy as he sees the horrors of the French Revolution as being only temporary and not characteristic of democracy, but rather of revolution. Because of this, French Revolutionary horrors are not a challenge to democracy. For Tocqueville, the true challenges to democracy are much more subtle. Commerce is seen as both a major benefit and as a major problem of democracy as while it brings great wealth and freedom, it can also lead to the development of a new aristocracy. This is important as it diminishes equality. For Tocqueville, one of the reasons equality is to be valued is because equality allows for the development of more sympathy as the more people are seen as alike, the more empathy they will have for one another.

Still, Tocqueville is well aware that democracy has the power to establish tyranny just as easily as it has freedom. Because of this, the passion of democracy must be restrained for the good of democracy as passions such as equality can lead to tyranny. Likewise, majorities must be restrained or the tyranny of the majority can develop. Though democracy has these problems, any attempt to solve these problems must take place in the general framework of democracy. One example of this is that radical individualism can only be solved through the participation in voluntary organizations. Because of this general principle, Tocqueville also champions the idea of federalism and champions local governance as this is seen as a proper channel for individualism. Likewise, this is why Tocqueville sees freedom of association as the most important freedom as this freedom can create an independent citizenry which also helps them to be better engaged in democracy. Democratic governance is seen as needed self-interest, but this must be a self-interest properly understood. The idea of “self-interest properly understood” is important because following from Hobbes, Tocqueville sees humans as being primarily a self-interested creature.

Religion is championed by Tocqueville as it is seen as embodying the best aspects of democracy while putting a check on its worst aspects. Freedom is seen as being grounded in morality and morality is seen as being grounded in religion. Even false religions still are seen as being able to perform these positive social functions. This does not mean Tocqueville is suggesting a strong Church-state partnership as religion needs to be separate from politics in order to get its full benefits. This is important as democracy is seen as being grounded in natural rights and is also seen as leading to a greater universalization of these rights. Because of this then, religion has an important part to play in the triumph of democracy over slavery.   

Georg F.W. Hegel

Representing the only entry to History of Political Philosophy to be written in a language other than English and then translated, Pierre Hasser focuses his essay, translated by Allan Bloom on Georg F.W. Hegel, who is perhaps the most influential philosopher of the post-Kantian era. Though Hegel had many writings, Hasser mostly focuses on his Philosophy of Right where Hegel lays out his conception of the ideal state. This ideal state is seen as the product of both eternal Reason and universal history. Another important book Hasser draws from is Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History.

Regardless, the state is a highly important element of Hegel’s thought as it is only through the state that the individual can come to his/her true reality and it is also only by the state that the individual can come to the universal. It should be noted that by “state” Hegel does not mean an actually existing state or states, but rather an ideal state. Hegel’s state, though representing the final end for humanity, it does not become divine. Despite his talk of the “ideal state” Hegel does not abandon the practical as he thinks politics, the actually existing state, and the ideal state must all be embraced.

Also important for Hegel is the idea of development, as it is through this development that the irrational can become the rational. Hegel’s state is also a product of this development and much like the human body; the state brings about unity to disjointed parts. Ultimately this development is linked to conflict. For Hegel, conflict is prior to the state and has its origins in the conflict between the master and the slave. It is though the conflict of the master and the slave that the worlds of the abstract and the practical are built. The state is seen as being founded to help end this conflict. In the state, all conflicts are seen as being rooted in the tension between the individual’s will and his/her status in the state.

In Hegel’s state, the human will to freedom can become a meaningful reality. This is an important point as for Hegel, the reason why states of the past were unable to do this and in fact often became very tyrannical was because they were not fully universalized and were thus subject to ruin. Ultimately, Hegel’s state will bring about the synthesis between liberty and order, a process that Hegel sees as being completed by the historical process. History is one of the most central processes for Hegel’s thought, particularly as it relates to the development of freedom, For Hegel, freedom has become known in history through three stages. These stages are as follows: 1) The Oriental stage, where one is free, 2) The Greco-Roman stage, where some are free, and 3) The Germanic stage, where all are free. In keeping with his idea of the historical development of freedom, Hegel sees Christianity as bringing the potential for freedom in the Greco-Roman world while the Germanic world would actualize this freedom, an act that was more specifically completed by the rise of Protestantism. Of particular importance for Hegel was the Protestant abolishment of the distinction between priests and the laity. Hegel also sees Protestantism as leading to the secularization of Christianity. What Hegel meant by this is that Christian ethics have now been fully introduced to the state while the state officially remained purely in the temporal realm.

Furthermore, though the state laws should be rational, Hegel still recognizes a social and historical basis for these laws and is thus very prudent in his application of universal rationality to the laws of existing states, which means that while no existing state can fully live up to his ideal, Hegel does and can recognize many positive aspects of existing states. Hegel particularly admires Prussia for its ability to represent both revolutionary exinges (as seen in its Protestantism) and traditional order (as seen in its monarchism). For Hegel, the modern state requires three elements. These elements are as follows: 1) rational law, 2) government, and 3) sentiment or morals. In keeping with his general trend of combining elements of revolution and conservatism, Hegel notes that Plato was guilty or only embracing the last two while the liberals and revolutionaries are guilty of only embracing the first one. For Hegel, the challenge that lays before humanity now is to embrace all three.

In keeping with his tripartite trend, Hegel also notes that there are three stages of education. These stages are as follows: 1) the family, 2) civil society, and 3) the state. The family and civil society are both seen as distinct from the state due to their particularity. The family does exist in unity and is a model for the state, but because this unity is based in the immediate rather than in rationality, it is seen as being below the state. Likewise, though civil society increases particularity, Hegel also sees it as allowing humans to better understand formal universality. This is important as for Hegel right requires the movement from the particular to the universal. This does not mean things rooted in the particular are bad as though the family and social groups are rooted in the particular, they help humans better understand the universal through development.

Hegel’s tripartite scheme continues on class as Hegel identifies three distinct classes. These classes are as follows: 1) the agrarian class, 2) the civil servant class, and 3) the industrial class. Because the agrarian class and the civil servant class are rooted in the family and the state respectively, it is only the industrial class according to Hegel that is essentially orientated towards the particular. Because of this, Hegel sees government regulation of industry as being required in order to prevent social degradation. Connecting to this is Hegel ideal construction of the state, which also contains three parts. These parts are as follows: 1) the legislature, which as the power to determine and establish the universal, 2) the executive, which as the power to bring the particular under the rule of the universal, and 3) the crown, where ultimate authority lies and is also seen as representing the unity of the state. Under this conception, civil service becomes elevated because it is seen as a universalized, democratic class as it is open to all classes. The civil service is thus based on merit, which Hegel thinks will bring about greater unity. Likewise, the legislature is seen as a reflection of the social order of society and should be grounded in the agrarian class as that class as being the most attune to the importance of order. Despite this focus though, other classes such as the industrial class are also represented.      

Hegel’s move to recognize both freedom and order causes him to accept many instances of freedom, but only in limited application. One particular way this can be seen is through Hegel’s ideas of freedom of communication, for while he generally supports it, he also sees some instances when censorship is appropriate. Likewise, equality is recognized, but only in a limited application of it as only equality before the law is seen as needed Social equality is not recognized under Hegel’s scheme.

Hegel sees war as a way of bringing about the fullness of the state and thus rejects Kant’s perpetual peace. Hegel also rejects international law, as without a state to guide it, Hegel sees international law as an incompetent method of bringing about peace. For Hegel, international law will always be rooted in the particular, never the universal. Wars are also seen as carrying with them an historic mission of the universal spirit and brings this spirit into eventual actualization. When this process is combined with “The End of History” an unusual development occurs on the matter of war and historical development as war is seen as both moving history, yet will also be abolished by it.

On one last point, Hegel’s state is seen as being open to all, but it is still founded on European and Protestant principles as these principles are seen as completing the universal project. As such, Europe must spread these principles to Asia just as they did previously to the Americas. As soon as this process is complete, Hegel’s project can at last be fully universalized and actualized.   

Jeremy Bentham and James Mill

For his entry to History of Political Thought, Timothy Fuller turns to two philosophers heavily connected with the foundation of one of the most important ethical systems in the modern era. The philosophers in question are Jeremy Bentham and James Mill. Despite the name of both men being in the title, Fuller spends very little time discussing Mill; instead spending most of the essay discussing Bentham’s views and only bringing up Mill at the end.

Still, one of the most important elements of Bentham’s thought to keep in mind is that he grounds his conception of morality in whether or not the consequences of that action are good or bad, with the conception of “good” being grounded in pleasure and the conception of ‘bad” being grounded in pain. As a result of this, morality becomes rooted in improvement of conditions through knowledge. By focusing on the development of knowledge, Bentham attempted to develop a scientific conception of morality, which means the actions of humans may be subjected to calculation and then have moral worth placed on those actions.

Bentham’s focus on science also has major implications on Bentham’s attitude toward legislation. Legislation based on tradition and custom is to be disregarded in favor of legislation based on scientific principles as these principles can best reveal what is pleasurable, and thus what is good. Here Bentham is displaying a clear influence of the Cartesian method as this method would enable him to step away from everything except for the pure principles that he wanted. Perhaps not surprisingly, this also caused him to reject the English common law tradition as for Bentham, this was a tradition based on an ignorance of scientific principles. Nor that those principles had been established, the English common law tradition in Bentham’s view could be done away with and replaced with a new, more scientific method of creating law.

Though the highly situational nature of Bentham’s theory has caused many to see both him and utilitarianism as an example of moral relativism, it is important to point out that while what is moral or immoral can change greatly depending upon the particular conditions, at the heart of his theory is an attempt to establish an universal basis for all moral decision making. What’s more, according to Bentham, historical conditions can still be taken into account, but these considerations cannot veto scientific morality.

Still, it is true particular conditions are highly important for Bentham as poor conditions can distract from a person’s individual will. The importance of conditions also factors into Bentham’s conception of happiness as happiness is not seen as being something in the abstract, but is rather deeply rooted in conditions. Despite Bentham’s focus on pleasure, happiness, and individualism, it should be noted that goodness is not seen as an absolute or left up to individuals. Rather, goodness for Bentham is grounded in what is good for the greatest number. Because of this, society becomes defined by the conflict between the rights of the individuals and the needs of the community. In order to help alleviate some of this conflict, Bentham also proposes a new justice system that focuses on rewards for doing right rather than on punishment for doing wrong.

Considering the importance of utilitarian thought on 19^th century liberalism, it is unsurprising that economic liberalism, intellectual freedom, and religious tolerance are all seen as essential for a utilitarian order. Utilitarianism also reflects another 19^th century liberal goal as Bentham hoped to create a long lasting balance between liberty and order through his theory. Bentham’s theory is still detached from society as Bentham sees this as essential to being able to understand what is truly the greatest good for the greatest number. Utilitarianism then presents itself as a neutral framework. In order to achieve this, Bentham suggests a radical reconstructuring of society in order to put it more in tune with utilitarian ethical principles as it was only though this that society would be able to fully understand utility. For Bentham, utility means that there is a greater focus on current conditions than on abstract principles in order to establish the moral worth of an action. Cooperation also plays a major role in Bentham’s theory as this is seen as key in avoiding both anarchy and despotism. It also helps us avoid a self-centered conception of the greater good. Though cooperation, utility could be fully incorporated into moral decision making. One of the major implications cooperation has is that the incensement of pleasure and the reduction of pain are seen as the chief moral drives, particularly for the legislature.

It is now that Fuller turns to Bentham’s chief disciple, James Mill. For Mill, his chief goal was to put Bentham’s theory in practice and as a result of this desire, proposed a series of reforms. Mill rejected the old democracy/ aristocracy/ monarchy categories of government as he found them all to be severely lacking. He ultimately proposes that a mixed government be used, but even here there is a very real danger of the aristocratic and monarchial elements of this mixed regime conspiring against the democratic elements. Thus, for Mill, the proper government should be grounded in democracy while monarchy and aristocracy are used to keep democratic excesses in check. One of the checks Mill proposes here is the use of voter qualifications. Still, monarchy and aristocracy are to be used for purely utilitarian ends and have no real value in and of themselves. This restrained form of democracy is to be used as it is seen as being best able to conceptualize the greatest good and also be rooted in scientific calculation, thus creating the most pleasurable outcome for the greatest number of people.       

Edmund Burke

For his addition to History of Political Philosophy, Harvey Mansfield, Jr. focuses on Edmund Burke, the man widely acknowledged as the father of conservatism. For Mansfield, Burke is best understood as a politician who made contributions to political philosophy in the name of good governance and his real talent is his ability to understand the meaning of events.

Burke is a conservative due to his focus on establishments, and it is within American conservatism where his focus on natural law has gained the most attention as it is here where Burke essentially offers a conservatively modernized form of Thomism. Still, one of the major aspects of Burke’s ideas, and the one where Mansfield spends a good deal of time discussing is Burke’s attitude towards theory. For Burke, theory can be harmful to political practice for creating too many abstractions. This is best seen in Burke’s writings on the French Revolution as according to Burke, the French Revolution showed the dangers of an excessively theoretical conception of politics as well as the great difficulties that arise from trying to but those theoretical concepts into practice. Burke thinks the French Revolutionists made several mistakes. These mistakes are as follows: 1) their grandiose schemes lead to absurd generalizations and made them resistant to the possibility of moderate reform, 2) they saw politics as predictable and universal, 3) they failed to understand that theory is simple, while practice is complex due to the necessity of nuance and compromise, and thus places more of an emphases on experience, 4) they also failed to fully understand that while theory is timeless, political practice is restricted to the here and now, and 5) they failed to see that practice makes better use of prudence. This is not to saw that Burke thinks all theory is inherently bad, as he does distinguish between good theory and bad theory, but he still sees that the Revolutionists made too much of a use of it. For Burke, prudence and practice are to govern the world and theory is to be below these things.

Burke’s focus on practice extends to other aspects of is thought, as drawing from Aristotle, ethics too is seen as a practice. Burke tried to establish this on firm principles in order to avoid falling into relativism. Practice also effected how Burke saw the British constitution as he approved of it because it was grounded in practice rather than in theory. Even better for Burke was the fact that this focus on practice permeated through all levels of governance. This focus on practice also caused Burke to see democracy as impossible as according to him, the practice of good governance required both hierarchy as well as a sense of power from above.

It should also be noted that while Burke uses the language of the social contract, the social contract is seen a far higher than ordinary contracts. It is a partnership between the living, the dead, and those yet to be born. Through this, the past, present, and future are to be united, a move that makes it impossible for one person to justly rule absolutely. This is not to say Burke is against all change as he does recognize that change is at times needed; he simply thinks that any change enacted should be conducted with great prudence and in piecemeal fashion. Making sure any change enacted is done with great prudence is not the sole task of government according to Burke as he also thinks that government should be concerned with the securing of natural rights. Still, the fact that Britain’s constitution had gone through numerous changes from the classical to the modern era and still contained elements of the past was for Burke a sign of its strength.

This focus on slow, measured change does cause Burke to focus on convenience, but this is not a convenience based in calculation as the utilitarians would do. This focus here causes Burke to root his defense of property on fairly pragmatic grounds. For Burke, property is to be praised as it suggests distinction and continuity and it rooted in nature. Even more important is that it also gives Burke a way to conceive of government without founding or theory. This connects to another part of Burke’s philosophy, prescription, as this gives him a way of conceptualizing change without making that change as violent or revolutionary. What’s more, for Burke, prescription is a way to guide theory.

Burke’s focus on the here and now over the abstract can also be seen in his attitude toward natural law. Burke may be heavily indebted to natural law, but his conception of natural law takes circumstances into account. For Burke, much of our feelings and attitudes are untaught and are there to guide people, thus providing a certain degree of latent wisdom. This does connect to the idea of prejudice, but by “prejudice” but does not mean that work in the same sense it is used today with heavily negative connotations. Instead, Burke uses the word “prejudice” is a more neutral to positive way. Prejudice is not seen as the enemy of reason, but rather as its ally. These prejudices mean that true neutrality is impossible and therefore we must learn to work with what we have. Burke thinks this prejudice and recognition of limits will lead to Gentlemanly virtue and this virtue will restrict unjust ambition. This is an important move as for Burke; it is restraints on unjust ambition that the Revolutionaries were lacking.       

Thomas Paine

Coming in at seven pages, Francis Canavan, S.J.’s essay on Thomas Paine is the shortest essay in History of Political Philosophy and has a difficult task ahead, as he must demonstrate Paine’s importance in the development of political philosophy as opposed to being a mere radical. Despite this, Canavan admits that Paine, as a pamphleteer is more of a propagandist than a thinker and tends to see the world in terms of black and white. And indeed, for Paine the past was an age where humans were in perpetual ignorance while the present is seen as ushering in a new era of reason.

Despite Paine’s distain for the past, he still shares one important element of his thought with the Ancient and Medieval philosophers, natural law. Still, he comes up with a different conception of it as while natural law is still seen as being known by reason, Paine also thinks that once the process of people coming to know the natural law is complete, a new conception of humanity, free from ignorance can rise to power. Government should be founded on these new principles and should be greatly limited. Here the state/ society distinction is even further developed as society is still seen as a natural good, but now the government is seen as the cause, not the solution to social disorder.

Rights play an important role in Paine’s thought as the right to pursue one’s own interest as well as security are seen as two highly important concepts. Further developing his ideas on “rights”, Paine identifies two kinds of rights. There two kinds of rights are as follows: 1) Natural rights, which are seen as belonging to people by their nature and 2) Civil rights, which are seen as belonging to people because they are members of society.

Paine sees civil society as coming about due to the natural human ability to reason, an idea that places Paine firmly in the social contract theory. What this means for the actual functioning of government is that all legitimate power must be rooted in popular sovereignty. The fact that this has rarely been the actual case is for Paine the reason why the history of government has been a history of tyranny. In particular, Paine is critical of monarchial and aristocratic forms of government due to the hereditary nature of their power and thinks that only representative government could respect people’s natural sovereignty. Indeed, in Paine’s ideal, representative government should be a place of radical equality, going as far as to place the executive in a purely administrative role as anything else would give one person too much power.

Because people would act in their best interest and everyone’s interest would be represented, representative government would end tyranny as no person would vote to put themselves in tyranny. Paine further hoped that representative government could end both war and poverty and wished to use the money saved from the lack of civil and military extravagance to help build a welfare state, a task Paine plans to do through progressive taxation. This is important as it shows that despite his strongly anti-state rhetoric, Paine still recognizes that the government has positive duties to perform.       

The Federalists

For his entry to History of Political Philosophy, Martin Diamond approaches his essay in a different fashion than the others have. While every other essay in the book focuses on one philosopher, or as in the case of Luther and Calvin as well as Bentham and Mill, two Diamond approached his essay differently as he instead focuses on one collection of essays written by three men and later compiled into a single book, that book being The Federalist Papers. Diamond begins his essay by noting that The Federalist Papers are both bound to their time and also able to address future generations. And while many critics of the essays have maintained that they amount to nothing more than pro-Constitution propaganda and are actually of low quality. Diamond argues for their place in the history of political philosophy.

            First and foremost, The Federalist Papers are to be understood as a defense of the republic and it is for this reason that the three authors, John Jay, Alexander Madison, and John Madison; all took Roman pseudonyms. Diamond also sees The Federalist Papers as primarily undertaking two tasks. These tasks are as follows: 1) defend the proposed Constitution and 2) critique the currently existing confederation. In order to do this, they had to fundamentally change how Americans viewed their republic as the United States had to now be seen as a republic, not as a collection of republics. This was an important task as the Constitution was often seen as anti-republican as it was generally assumed at the time that only small countries could be republican in nature while larger counties by their nature trended towards despotism. It was well understood that a republic needed a well-educated and engaged population and a small country was seen as the most conductive environment for these factors.

            For the Federalists however, the Constitution provided a framework for such a citizenry. In The Federalist Papers, a much more pure synthesis of republicanism and democracy is proposed while this synthesis still maintains a distinction between a republic and pure democracy. Instead, the virtue of “popular government” is exalted which created the idea that the United State was not a mixed regime, but rather a wholly popular state. For this, a new science of politics would be needed that would now be focused on the new understanding of democracy and would also be more tailored for a large republic.

            This is not to say the Federalists had an unwavering support of democracy, as they did recognize three instances where democracy could go wrong. These instances are as follows: 1) the people lose control of their representatives, 2) popular majorities, through their elected officials, become oppressive, and 3) popular majorities become foolish and as a result, elected officials become the same. Because of these fears, safeguards to prevent this from happening become essential as now tyranny can come from both rulers as well as from the masses. One of the key ways in which this was done was by splitting the legislature into two houses while the legislature itself was to be checked by both the executive and judicial branches. Here, the Federalists were trying to encourage the development of rightly understood ambition that could harness the power of ambition to do good while avoiding the negative consequences of ambition. Representation is also seen as essential as for the Federalists; representative government can check the excesses of both government of the few as well as government by the many.

 In the end, the idea of separation of powers and checks and balances is a major factor in Federalist arguments for a large republic as while separation of powers is essential for preserving liberty, it is not seen as being very useful in a small republic. What this means is that in order to properly maintain separation of power, a large republic is needed. This connects deeply to the idea of factions, which are seen as good as they can prevent one faction from gaining too much power. Smaller societies are seen as more united and thus it is easier for one faction to gain control of the society. By contrast, a large representative republic is seen as more likely to produce the sort of divisions that great factions, thus making it more difficult for one faction to gain control. Because of this elevation of the importance of factions, commercial republics are highly regarded as they encourage the diversity that creates factions. Furthermore, trade is seen as an important way of bringing about freedom. Even more important is what the use of factions shows what the Federalists are trying to do, get good results for bad motivation. This is because the Federalists know that ultimately the motivation for each of the factions is selfish, but through their coming together, this selfish motivation can be used to bring about good.     

Adam Smith

In his first contribution to History of Political Philosophy, Joseph Cropsey focuses on the political thought of Adam Smith, a man who helped lay the theoretical justifications of free market capitalism. Though today he is only thought of as an economist, it needs to be remembered that Smith’s actual employment was a moral philosopher. Though he is counted as a political philosopher as the purposes of Strauss and Cropsey; there is very little political philosophy in his moral thought while his economic theory has more implications for political philosophy than any direct contribution. Still, his work is highly important as he did make one of the major defenses of liberal capitalism.

In order to understand Smith, it is helpful to understand his two major influences, John Locke and David Hume. The influence Locke had over Smith is easy to spot, particularly in their shared concern for liberty, property rights, and tolerance. It is more difficult to spot Hume’s influence, but it can be seen in his conception of morality as being rooted in feelings. Still, Smith grounded his conception of utility in a sort of a conclusion of reason rather than in a sense of feeling as Hume did. One major way Smith’s position on feelings is manifested is through his teachings on sympathy, which is a highly important element of Smith’s moral theory as it allows people to see other’s as oneself. Because Smith sees sympathy as being natural to people, he also sees both moral law and society as being natural.

Smith’s views on society are interesting as his “natural right” depends heavily on a supposed impartial observer viewing the actions of people so that it may be properly judged. It should also be pointed out that while Smith sees society as being natural, he does not have this same view of political society as it is more narrowly conceived and mostly exists for the purpose of safeguarding justice. As a result of this, there is now an even greater sense of the divide between politics and society. From here Smith makes three moves. These moves are as follows: 1) moral philosophy is divided between two parts, ethics and jurisprudence. Justice is placed in the latter part. 2) Justice is seen as giving what is due to a person, no more and no less and does not necessitate gratitude. 3) Political society is only seen as natural in the weak sense.

All this talk of what is natural may appear to be Medieval in origin, but it needs to be understood that it is really much more mechanical than what was found in the Middle Ages. Still, natural tendencies are highly valued by Smith, particularly in his ethics. This can be seen in his ethics as he defends a consequentialist based approach on the grounds that it is more natural than intention-based ethics. His focus on what is natural can also be seen in the tension Smith sees between the natural sentiments of people and the natural course of things as people labor but are pushed back by nature, thus making work difficult. The tension Smith notices here ends up leading to one of the more important elements of his thought as the tension between people’s natural sentiments and the natural course of things ends up producing wealth, which Smith elevates. It also needs to be recognized that sentiment still guides people more than reason, and it is this sentiment that forms the basis of morality, much as it also does in Hume. And much like Hume, Smith also makes use of the is/ought distinction in order to avoid giving moral worth to every feeling.

Smith supports democracy as he feels that it is the system that most mitigates the differences between rulers and the ruled, a move that Smith hopes will be able to bring together society and political society. Because of this, a free, reasonable, comfortable, and tolerant life for all those involved is preferred. A nation’s wealth is seen as the best way of bringing about these conditions while free market capitalism is seen as the best way of generating this wealth. The wealth of a nation and its welfare are therefore not easily separated.

It should be noted that while Smith certainly believed in capitalism, he was not a dogmatist for them as many of his followers would later become. Smith grounds value in labor and thinks that labor and land owners share in the wealth they created together. What this means is that Smith could have had no conception of talking to the multitude of laboring poor nor defending putting them in that position. What’s more, Smith did not even call his system “capitalism.” Rather, Smith called it “the system of natural liberty” and was to be a system open to all. Though the intention of this system was indeed to produce liberty, it must be understood that by “liberty” Smith was keeping with tradition as he had a far more communal conception of liberty than what would later develop and was also careful to distinguish liberty from license. Still, Smith had a highly positive outlook for the possibility of the growth of liberty as he thought that this system would naturally spread throughout the world.