The next entry in History
of Political Philosophy is Robert S. Hill’s take on David Hume. Hill begins
his essay by noting a central paradox in Hume’s thought. The paradox Hill has
in mind here is the idea that Hume’s skepticism challenges the very idea of
political philosophy, while at the same time he is the author of his own
comprehensive political doctrine. At the base of Hume’s thought is the idea
that there are a collection and succession things in our minds which he calls
perceptions. According to Hume, there are two types of perceptions. These kinds
are as follows: 1) impressions, which are what we hear, see, feel, love, hate,
desire, or will and 2) ideas which occur when we reflect on a passion or object
not present. It is important to note that for Hume, all ideas must fist come
from impressions.
This introduces a good deal of uncertainty as our senses are
fallible, thus we cannot have knowledge in the fullest sense nor can we have
absolute certainty. For Hume, true knowledge is only that which cannot be
thought of otherwise, as in the case of a triangle with anything other than
three sides or a married bachelor. In doing this though, Hume turns the
philosophical quest to use skepticism to establish an absolute foundation of
knowledge against itself. This has several radical implications. Among one of
the most important of these implications is the idea that cause and effect only
appear to be absolute because we have seen it so many times. But in reality
this cannot confirm any idea we may have as it may simply be the case that we
have not experienced an exception to this rule.
Our knowledge is dependent upon how we conceive things, and
as this can always be wrong, the ideas we gain from this perception may also be
wrong. What this means is that the knowledge we have essentially comes from
habits, though habits may be overcome by a stronger habit as would be the case
with the proposition: “All Irishmen are drunks.” Such a proposition may arise
from the habit of seeing many drunk Irishmen, but it could be overcome by the
stronger habit of being able to conceive of exceptions when we experience an
Irishman that is not drunk. One thing that this does mean is that we can
arrange our perceptions in such a way that the appearance of some kind of order
is created.
Hume also sees virtue and vice in this way as for Hume,
virtue and vice are not relations because they are always connected to some
external object. However, they are also not matters of fact because they cannot
really be discovered and are for Hume based in passion rather than in reason.
Hume’s divorce of morality from both nature and reason is highly important and
causes him to create a strong distinction between the “is” and the “ought.” One
of the implications Hume’s theory what morality is passion based has is that
virtue and vice are now constituted by sentiment. Thus, it is not the case that
virtue is approved of because it is virtue, but rather it is the case that
virtue is virtue because it is approved. Morality is thus founded on its
ability to produce good results.
Though Hume is working in the light of Hobbes and Locke, he
dismisses the idea that rule and power are based solely on self-interests for
four reasons. These reasons are as follows: 1) it exaggerates the power of
reason, 2) not all desire under the desire for one’s own good, 3) self-interest
presupposes the existence of other passions, and 4) self-interest is not
necessarily the strongest or dominate passion. For Hume, passion exists in
multitude, not in a singularity. For Hume, morals may be a matter of taste, but
Hume avoids relativism by noting that there are such things as right and wrong
taste. Thus, Hume attempts place morality along with causal and solid reasoning
on a strong ground so that they can be distinct from things like mere prejudice
and fantasy. Hume partially does this by making great use of common interests
in an attempt to restrict individual interests.
For Hume, this means the desire to have stability becomes
highly important as stability makes it easier for use to know what common
interest entails. Thus, justice is seen as ultimately coming from mutual
helpfulness, so the question of justice is not what benefits individuals, but
rather what benefits society. This means a strong conception of community is
created, and with that comes the idea that government may both protect people
as they pursue their interests and may also require them to pursue it. By doing
this, the government may create what Hume calls “artificial virtue.” Artificial
virtue is be understood by contrasting it to what Hume calls natural virtue as
in natural virtue, virtues are rooted in people’s instincts while in the case
of artificial virtue, they are not.
On matters of governance, Hume employs monarchial,
aristocratic, and democratic elements in order to keep the other elements in
check. By doing this, Hume wishes to avoid arbitrary government, which he sees
as a threat to liberty. In many ways, Hume ends up combining a Whig/ radical
political philosophy with a skeptical/ Tory temperament. It should be noted
that Hume rejects the contract theory of government for several reasons. One of
these reasons is that for Hume, the contract theory of government contradicted
people’s natural sentiment to have order. Hume also fears that contract theory
may open up the door for a new form of tyranny and was also guilty of
overstating the power of reason. Finally, he also sees contract theory as
weakening the foundations of society. Considering these things, it is not
surprising that instead of reason, Hume wants custom to guide human life. This focus
on custom as well as Hume’s desire to restrain reason has led many to read Hume
as a pre-Burkean conservative.
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