Alfarabi

The Islamic contribution to political philosophy is rarely discussed, but Muhsin Mahdi’s essay in History of Political Philosophy attempts to fill some of that void by discussing the career of Alfarabi, who like Cicero and St. Augustine before him did with Roman law and Christianity respectively, attempted to synthesize Islam with classical Greek philosophy, particularly that of Plato. More than just being a version of St. Augustine sans Christianity and plus Islam or an Islamic Cicero, Alfarabi had his one unique changes he had to get though in order to create a workable system as he had a far different environment than Cicero did and also enjoyed less freedom than St. Augustine did. The major contribution Alfarabi does offer though is a way of looking at the Platonic idea of the most just order though the lens of Islam. Before any discussion of Alfarabi’s philosophy can be discusses however, it is first necessary to understand the audience he is writing for as Alfarabi essentially has two audiences, one is Muslim, which he aims to give a more robust understanding of the truth of their religion. He other audience is non-Muslim, for whom Alfarabi wishes to be able to guide to the truth of Islam. Accordingly, as he is seeking converts and converts will likely not be convinced by purely Islamic based arguments, Alfarabi makes very few of those, instead focusing more on arguments from non-Islamic sources.

As he is within the classical view of political science, Alfarabi sees the discipline as the enquiry into the most just form of order, which will allow human excellence to be realized. Happiness is thus seen as the end result of this happiness. The virtuous regime is thus seen as the coming together of men in the purpose of becoming virtuous. The citizens of this regime as placed into three classes. The first and ruling class is the philosophers who know the nature of things. The second class is the followers of the philosophers who know the nature of things by example. The third class then is the rest of the citizens. The best regime then is seen as aristocracy. Just as the just regime has certain characteristics and types, so does the unjust regime. According to Alfarabi, the three types of unjust regimes are those where the citizens have no desire to acquire knowledge about philosophical subjects. The second type of unjust regime are those that have true knowledge and yet ignore it, which is followed by the third type of unjust regime, those that have false knowledge.

Alfarabi then further divides regimes into six basic types. First is the regime of necessity, which is confined to the basic functions of life. This is followed by the vile regime, which is based on wealth and then followed by the base regime, which is based on imaginary pleasures. The fourth type of regime Alfarabi is the regime of honor, which is based on being honored by others. This is followed by the regime of domination, based on, as the title would suggest, the domination of others. The sixth and final type of regime Alfarabi mentions is what he calls corporate association and is rooted in freedom. Religion factors heavily in Alfarabi’s conception of the just order as a just ruler must be able to combine divine science with political science. Another important aspect of the just ruler is the ability to actualize his rational factory. Because the just ruler must combine divine and political science, a far more robust conception of the view that God is the source of law is developed. Connecting into this view of the combination of the divine and political sciences is Alfarabi’s view that a good ruler must present both a rational and divine conception of happiness.   

Imagination and prophecy factor heavily in Alfarabi’s conception of the just order. The imagination for Alfarabi has three factors. They are as follows: 1) the imagination acts as a reservoir of sensible impression after the disappearance of the object of sensation. 2) The imagination also combines sensible impressions to form a complex sensible image. 3) And finally, the imagination also produces imitations. Prophecy factors into this as the destruction of prophecy leads to the destruction of both the imaginative faculty as well as the rational faculty. The destruction of prophecy is thus made even more horrifying for Alfarabi as for him; reason and imagination are how we communicate with our active intellect. Do to the importance of both reason and prophecy, a just regime can be ruled by either a philosopher or a prophet. Though prophecy does factor heavily in Alfarabi’s conception of the good, it does appear to become less important as time goes on as while philosophy is needed for both the founding and the survival of the just order, prophecy is only needed for the just order’s founding.

What is even more interesting, is that Alfarabi has a more dynamic conception of the just order as while Plato ascribed a high degree of stability to the just order, Alfarabi seems to recognize that change is more necessary to such an order as the just ruler is given a high degree of authority to change laws when needed in order to keep the order just. Furthermore, while the most perfect ruler would be both a prophet and a philosopher, Alfarabi does recognize that such a man can be difficult to find and suggests dropping “prophet” as an attribute of a just ruler if no man can meet all the qualifications. If it is still the case that no qualified man can be found, then Alfarabi recognizes that joint rule may be a good solution to this problem. Even then, Alfarabi’s just order is not purely run by philosophy as Alfarabi further writes that a just ruler must also be warlike. This is because only some of the citizens can be persuaded through philosophy. The others then will then need force to do what is right.

Several readers may have noticed that while Alfarabi is clearly influenced by Plato, I have refrained from using the more Platonic word “city” instead using words like “regime” and “order”. This was intentional as the “the city” as Plato and Aristotle understood is not central Alfarabi’s thinking; instead he sets up three organizations for a virtuous regime to survive. These organizations are as follows: 1) the world, 2) the nation and 3) the city. As the entire world is placed on the top for the survival of a just order, a more universal conception of humanity is created. As a downside though, such an idea could potentially give justification for world conquest. Alfarabi does attempt to solve this possible problem by noting that a good ruler must be fully able at both peace and war. Furthermore, while the city is nowhere near as important for Alfarabi as it was for Plato or Aristotle, Alfarabi does give one important distinction in favor of the cities: only they can be ordered by their level of perfection, thus eliminating for “more just nations” to try and dominate “less just nations”. Alfarabi also has a highly developed theory of democracy as he sees democracy as being rooted in two concepts, freedom and equality. In a democracy, authority is justified by the presentation of these two things. Furthermore, as there is no absolute distinction between the ruled and rulers, Alfarabi insists that these two groups don’t really exist in a democracy, instead democracy is governed by the supreme will. Thought this, democracy thus offers both great promises and great threats as it allows for both the greatest amount of good things as well as the greatest amount of evil things.     

Clearly one of the least well know philosophers covered in Strauss and Cropsey’s book, as well as the only Muslim, Alfarabi is seen to be a brilliant and insightful philosopher that was able to combine Platonic philosophy with Islam without one engulfing the other. Though the impact of his thought was not as great on Islam as St. Augustine’s was on Christianity, it certainly was large enough to be noted.  More than just combine Platonism with Islam, Alfarabi also shows a significant willingness to understand society beyond the city, allowing for a wider conception of political philosophy to immerge. He was also able to make some contributions to democratic theory and thus has cemented him place alongside other, more famous names in History of Political Philosophy.