St. Thomas Aquinas

Ernest Fortin’s second entry in History of Political Philosophy focuses on St. Thomas Aquinas, who is perhaps the most famous philosopher of the Middle Ages, and certainly it’s most famous Aristotelian, as he was able to brilliantly synthesize Aristotelian philosophy with the already existing paradigm of Western thought, which combined the Bible, Platonic-Stoic philosophy and Roman law into a new system which would serve as the dominate strain of thought in Western Christendom for several centuries.

Despite the massive influence Aristotle would later play in the development of Western thought, the West was actually late to the Aristotle game due to the fact Aristotle was not translated into Western languages until later, which lead initially to Muslims and Jews making more use of Aristotle’s works. Despite this late start, St. Thomas Aquinas had a major advantage over his Muslim and Jewish counterparts, as unlike the other Abrahamic religions, which held philosophy at arm’s length with few notable exceptions, Christianity had no such bias and in fact, the study of philosophy was even required. Due to this, Christianity became more Aristotelian while Judaism and Islam were more Platonic, and even then, they were more skeptical of the influence of Greek philosophy than their Christian counterparts were. According to Fortin, this may because Judaism and Islam saw themselves as a set of divine laws while Christianity was more focused on faith. It is for this reason that while both Islam and Judaism saw jurisprudence as the highest science while Christians saw that to be theology. The move away from jurisprudence to theology of the highest science, for Fortin, was also a major factor in the traditional Christian distinction between spiritual and temporal power. The focus on both theology and philosophy, and the separation of law with God lead to Aquinas’s view of reason and revelation operating by two different functions, though both remained highly important.   

Aquinas had a bigger impact on Western thought than just theology as he also made significant insights into political philosophy. As with one of his chief mentors, Aristotle, Aquinas starts out by seeing man as a political animal that must have civil society. In Aquinas’s thought though, there are differing levels to this civil society. The first level and the basic building block of society is the family, which provides basic protection and satisfies needs. The second level is the city which gives the protection the family cannot provide as well as bring man into fullness. As with Plato and Aristotle, the city is of central importance, and thus the common good is to take precedent over the private good. Still, not all cities are created equal, for as with it was for the Greeks, there are just cities and unjust cities. For Aquinas, governance is what distinguishes cities from one another. Aquinas takes the importance of governance to an extreme conclusion as he sees a just absolute monarch as the best form of government, but an unjust absolute monarch as the most dangerous form of government. Still, ultimately Aquinas realizes that it is unlikely the non-virtuous masses would chose a virtuous king to rule over them, thus the rule of the virtuous must be balance with the rule of consent. Still, the making of the law is not seen as a democratic process as Aquinas sees lawmaking as something that should be done by the moral few. Aquinas’s reason for doing this is because he sees morality as something that arises though practice, and is thus something few can attain. Though he has an undemocratic view on the making of laws, Aquinas is far more optimistic on the nature of reason as he sees it is something all in society have. Despite his seeing the family and the city as two differing levels of society, Aquinas is still careful not to entirely equate them as the unity of the family and the unity of the city are seen as two different things, thus maintaining the public/ private distinction.

Drawing from Aristotle, Aquinas sees morality as a practice. For this reason it is not enough that a moral man merely studies natural law, but also must come into contact with it and acted with it as well. Furthermore, Aquinas sees all moral virtue as ultimately being based in what he calls the four cardinal virtues. They are as follows: 1) Moderation, which introduces reason to man’s appetitive part, 2) Courage, which rectifies man’s spirited part, 3) Justice, which is seen as being found in the will and regulates man’s dealings with other men, and finally 4) Prudence, which regulates the proper exercise of all other virtues. All other virtues are seen as part of these virtues and are also grouped into three parts. The parts are as follows: the subjective parts, the potential parts, and the integral parts. The subjective parts are the various species into which a given virtue can be divided according to the matter with which it dwells. The potential parts are those virtues that deal with a secondary act or matter of a principle virtue and do not contain in themselves the full essence or power of that virtue. Integral parts are not complete virtues in and of themselves, but represent the various elements that are needed for the formation of a complete virtue.

Drawing once again from Aristotle, Aquinas sees morality as also being connected to the “Golden Mean,” but Aquinas does offer some modifications to Aristotle’s original theory, for while Aristotle’s original scheme required complete knowledge of a situation in order to act morally, Aquinas ultimately sees this as impossible. Therefore, Aquinas attempts to solve this by making man a greater part of the moral order and more greatly involved in direct participation, which is done though natural law, thereby giving all people an idea of morals. On the subject of natural law, it is important to remember that while it is of great importance, it is still only a first step in the formation of a moral person as it can only establish basic morality. After that point, divine law is needed. It is also important to remember that for Aquinas, moral principles must be reasonable in order for them to be useful, thus avoiding schemes of morality that no one can really follow. But while moral theory for Aquinas has a definite ceiling, it also has a definite floor as no one can act against natural law out of ignorance. Aquinas also differs from Aristotle in that for Aquinas, morality is completely centered in God.

Natural law has a greater use for Aquinas that just to create a base foundation for morality, as it also helps synthesize Biblical faith and Abrahamic philosophy. This synthesis is due to natural law’s ability to bridge both reason and revelation. Tying into this synthesis is the distinction Aquinas makes between God’s intellect and God’s will, which enables a far more robust conception of God’s free will, and as a result, human free will to be created. The synthesis Aquinas created also caused a major shift in the Aristotelian conception of happiness. For Aristotle, happiness is this world based. For Aquinas however, happiness is based in the next world as he must take into account the Christian conception of the afterlife.

Though Aquinas has commonly been accused of “baptizing Aristotle,” in reality, Aquinas was quite aware of the limitations involved in his project. Ultimately, this assured the survival of Aristotelian philosophy in Christendom during the Middle Ages as by recognizing the limits of his project, Aquinas was sure to place Aristotle under the Church, due to this, it was much easier for Christians to accept Aristotle in a way the Muslims and the Jews were more weary of, thus preventing any major move to kick Aristotelian philosophy out of Christianity as there was in Islam.

Along with St. Augustine, whom Ernest Fortin also contributed the essay for in History of Political Philosophy, St. Thomas Aquinas is the best known Christian outside of the New Testament that lived before 1500. Along with St. Augustine, Aquinas also helped formulate the modern West as Western culture has often been described as the marriage between Athens (Greek philosophy), Rome (the Roman legal tradition), and Jerusalem (the Christian religion via Judaism), a marriage which Aquinas helped to formulate. He was also a major player in Scholasticism, which dominated Western thought for several hundred years. Though Scholasticism eventually fell out of favor, Aquinas is still more than of simple historical importance and still has much to offer the philosophical debate today, which Fortin shows in his essay. The essay, to be sure, does not go over the limitations of Aquinas’s philosophy, but as an introduction to his political thought, which is what it was intended to do, it works very well.             

Moses Maimonides

Leo Strauss’ second entry in History of Political Philosophy, centers on the great Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides. Continuing the trend of philosophers who have made a significant impact on the development of political philosophy by synthesizing philosophy with an existing political/ religious system, be it the Roman legal tradition (as Cicero did), Christianity (as St. Augustine did), or Islam (as Alfarabi) did, Maimonides continues on this development by synthesizing Greek philosophy with Judaism. Strauss begins his essay by distinguishing Jewish philosophy from Christian philosophy on an important point. Unlike Scholasticism, medieval Jewish philosophy developed in the context of a divine revelation that assumed the form of law rather than dogma or faith. As a result of this, the Jewish philosophy of this time tends to be heavily legal centric.

Despite the legal nature of their writings, Jewish philosophers tended to address politics indirectly, allowing the subject to be brought up in relation to other subjects. Despite the fact that Jewish philosophy was being produced, much like in Islam, there was a significant debate on what exactly the relationship between Judaism and philosophy was supposed to be. Though it was never fully accepted, according to Strauss, Maimonides was highly influential in making this Jewish-philosophy synthesis more acceptable. Maimonides shows a high degree of influence from the ancient Greeks, in particular Aristotle as people are seen as first and foremost as a political animal. Furthermore, people are also to use their rationality to solve problems.

Maimonides’ conception of man is highly interesting on several points though as man has two natures, the nature of the body and the nature of the soul. Because of these two natures, there are also two types of law, the human law and the divine law. These two types of law correspond to the two types of perfection, the perfection of the body and the perfection of the soul. While these two conceptions of the law are to be understood as distinct, they should not be understood as mutually exclusive as it is possible for a law to contribute to both the perfection of the body as well as the perfection of the mind. Though both types of law and both types of perfection are important, Maimonides sees ultimate perfection as being removed from the body, and as such, human law.

This should not diminish how important the human law still is in Maimonides thought as it is still seen as the highest revelation from God. With this in mind, it is easy to understand why Maimonides placed so much emphasis on the importance of Moses, as it was he who gave the Jews their laws. So important is Moses to Maimonides’ thought, the Mosaic Law is seen as the only divine law, or at least the only perfect divine law. In particular, Maimonides thought the Mosaic Law should be praised for being both absolute and universal, which Maimonides saw as being of absolute importance for anything that was to call itself “divine law.” Following the emphasis Maimonides places on Moses and the Mosaic Law, the prophet is seen as essentially serving a political function. Though this is obvious parallels with the pervious philosopher this series focused on, Alfarabi, Maimonides does introduce some new ideas into how the prophet is to also be seen as a political figure. First off, according to Maimonides, there are three conceptions of philosophy. They are as follows: 1) the vulgar conception, which claims that God choses whomever he wants and transforms this person into a prophet. The next conception is 2) the conception of the philosophers, which claims that becoming a prophet is the highest outcome of human perfection. The last conception of prophecy Maimonides mentions is 3) the opinion of the law, which sees becoming a prophet as arising through desire and education. Beyond that, Maimonides also sees prophecy as the overflowing of God to man’s rational faculty, and after that to his imaginative faculty. Furthermore, a prophet is also seen as attaining threefold perfection. Those perfections are as follows: reason, moral, and imagination. Maimonides then uses this idea of perfection in order to justify the prophet’s political role. The prophet has this role due to his drive towards perfection.

Because of the political nature of his role, the prophet is seen as having to possess several characteristics. First off, he must have great courage as he faces great danger from those whom he rules. Furthermore, the prophet is also seen as both a divine messenger and a lawgiver and must be able to ably perform both roles. Maimonides’ conception of the law and prophecy also ultimately forms the backbone of his critique of classical philosophy as he sees it as being in error by only focusing on the political. For Maimonides, what this did is cause the classical philosophers to fail to realize perfection requires divine law, and as such, divine law should be seen as superior to political law.

Following from this, it is perhaps easy to see why the prophet can be seen as being on a divine mission to improve the social order. Due to the nature of the prophet’s mission to improve the social order, being a prophet and being a king are connected in Maimonides’ mind. This drive also means that sometimes war will be needed in order to improve the social order. Still, despite the importance of kings and prophets to Maimonides’ thought, the king is still seen as being subject to the law, showing that no matter how important the prophet-king may be, the law is still of central and overriding importance. This discussion of the prophet king leads to a major point in Maimonides’ thought, the role of the Messiah. While Christians believed the Messiah had already come in Jesus Christ, Maimonides did not and had a radically different conception of what the Messiah would be like than the Christians had. For Maimonides, the only change to the political order the Messiah would bring would be to the status of the Jewish people, as he would bring the Jews back to Palestine where they would finally break all yoke of foreign oppression and would be fully free to study the Torah and gain wisdom. In his rule of the Jewish people, Maimonides also thinks that will bring about the synthesis of reason and politics.

One final piece of Maimonides’ thought that may be worth mentioning is that contrary to so many others of his day, he greatly downplays the importance of natural law. This is due to the fact that he thinks that only a few laws can be known by human speculation. Strauss, to his detriment does not make much of this part of Maimonides’ thought, but I think it is well worth mentioning, particularly in light of the downfall of natural law that would occur in the modern age.

Though not as good as his writings on the ancients, Strauss here still shows his greatest strength, interpreting the thought of others. Maimonides is unique in the History of Political Philosophy in that not only did he synthesize his religion with classical philosophy, hut he also did it as a religious minority, thus giving some conception of a religion-philosophy synthesis outside the power structure. Still, despite this, Maimonides’ greatest impact has not been in philosophy directly, but rather indirectly as it was his synthases of Judaism and Aristotelian philosophy that encouraged St. Thomas Aquinas to do the same with Christianity.                          

Alfarabi

The Islamic contribution to political philosophy is rarely discussed, but Muhsin Mahdi’s essay in History of Political Philosophy attempts to fill some of that void by discussing the career of Alfarabi, who like Cicero and St. Augustine before him did with Roman law and Christianity respectively, attempted to synthesize Islam with classical Greek philosophy, particularly that of Plato. More than just being a version of St. Augustine sans Christianity and plus Islam or an Islamic Cicero, Alfarabi had his one unique changes he had to get though in order to create a workable system as he had a far different environment than Cicero did and also enjoyed less freedom than St. Augustine did. The major contribution Alfarabi does offer though is a way of looking at the Platonic idea of the most just order though the lens of Islam. Before any discussion of Alfarabi’s philosophy can be discusses however, it is first necessary to understand the audience he is writing for as Alfarabi essentially has two audiences, one is Muslim, which he aims to give a more robust understanding of the truth of their religion. He other audience is non-Muslim, for whom Alfarabi wishes to be able to guide to the truth of Islam. Accordingly, as he is seeking converts and converts will likely not be convinced by purely Islamic based arguments, Alfarabi makes very few of those, instead focusing more on arguments from non-Islamic sources.

As he is within the classical view of political science, Alfarabi sees the discipline as the enquiry into the most just form of order, which will allow human excellence to be realized. Happiness is thus seen as the end result of this happiness. The virtuous regime is thus seen as the coming together of men in the purpose of becoming virtuous. The citizens of this regime as placed into three classes. The first and ruling class is the philosophers who know the nature of things. The second class is the followers of the philosophers who know the nature of things by example. The third class then is the rest of the citizens. The best regime then is seen as aristocracy. Just as the just regime has certain characteristics and types, so does the unjust regime. According to Alfarabi, the three types of unjust regimes are those where the citizens have no desire to acquire knowledge about philosophical subjects. The second type of unjust regime are those that have true knowledge and yet ignore it, which is followed by the third type of unjust regime, those that have false knowledge.

Alfarabi then further divides regimes into six basic types. First is the regime of necessity, which is confined to the basic functions of life. This is followed by the vile regime, which is based on wealth and then followed by the base regime, which is based on imaginary pleasures. The fourth type of regime Alfarabi is the regime of honor, which is based on being honored by others. This is followed by the regime of domination, based on, as the title would suggest, the domination of others. The sixth and final type of regime Alfarabi mentions is what he calls corporate association and is rooted in freedom. Religion factors heavily in Alfarabi’s conception of the just order as a just ruler must be able to combine divine science with political science. Another important aspect of the just ruler is the ability to actualize his rational factory. Because the just ruler must combine divine and political science, a far more robust conception of the view that God is the source of law is developed. Connecting into this view of the combination of the divine and political sciences is Alfarabi’s view that a good ruler must present both a rational and divine conception of happiness.   

Imagination and prophecy factor heavily in Alfarabi’s conception of the just order. The imagination for Alfarabi has three factors. They are as follows: 1) the imagination acts as a reservoir of sensible impression after the disappearance of the object of sensation. 2) The imagination also combines sensible impressions to form a complex sensible image. 3) And finally, the imagination also produces imitations. Prophecy factors into this as the destruction of prophecy leads to the destruction of both the imaginative faculty as well as the rational faculty. The destruction of prophecy is thus made even more horrifying for Alfarabi as for him; reason and imagination are how we communicate with our active intellect. Do to the importance of both reason and prophecy, a just regime can be ruled by either a philosopher or a prophet. Though prophecy does factor heavily in Alfarabi’s conception of the good, it does appear to become less important as time goes on as while philosophy is needed for both the founding and the survival of the just order, prophecy is only needed for the just order’s founding.

What is even more interesting, is that Alfarabi has a more dynamic conception of the just order as while Plato ascribed a high degree of stability to the just order, Alfarabi seems to recognize that change is more necessary to such an order as the just ruler is given a high degree of authority to change laws when needed in order to keep the order just. Furthermore, while the most perfect ruler would be both a prophet and a philosopher, Alfarabi does recognize that such a man can be difficult to find and suggests dropping “prophet” as an attribute of a just ruler if no man can meet all the qualifications. If it is still the case that no qualified man can be found, then Alfarabi recognizes that joint rule may be a good solution to this problem. Even then, Alfarabi’s just order is not purely run by philosophy as Alfarabi further writes that a just ruler must also be warlike. This is because only some of the citizens can be persuaded through philosophy. The others then will then need force to do what is right.

Several readers may have noticed that while Alfarabi is clearly influenced by Plato, I have refrained from using the more Platonic word “city” instead using words like “regime” and “order”. This was intentional as the “the city” as Plato and Aristotle understood is not central Alfarabi’s thinking; instead he sets up three organizations for a virtuous regime to survive. These organizations are as follows: 1) the world, 2) the nation and 3) the city. As the entire world is placed on the top for the survival of a just order, a more universal conception of humanity is created. As a downside though, such an idea could potentially give justification for world conquest. Alfarabi does attempt to solve this possible problem by noting that a good ruler must be fully able at both peace and war. Furthermore, while the city is nowhere near as important for Alfarabi as it was for Plato or Aristotle, Alfarabi does give one important distinction in favor of the cities: only they can be ordered by their level of perfection, thus eliminating for “more just nations” to try and dominate “less just nations”. Alfarabi also has a highly developed theory of democracy as he sees democracy as being rooted in two concepts, freedom and equality. In a democracy, authority is justified by the presentation of these two things. Furthermore, as there is no absolute distinction between the ruled and rulers, Alfarabi insists that these two groups don’t really exist in a democracy, instead democracy is governed by the supreme will. Thought this, democracy thus offers both great promises and great threats as it allows for both the greatest amount of good things as well as the greatest amount of evil things.     

Clearly one of the least well know philosophers covered in Strauss and Cropsey’s book, as well as the only Muslim, Alfarabi is seen to be a brilliant and insightful philosopher that was able to combine Platonic philosophy with Islam without one engulfing the other. Though the impact of his thought was not as great on Islam as St. Augustine’s was on Christianity, it certainly was large enough to be noted.  More than just combine Platonism with Islam, Alfarabi also shows a significant willingness to understand society beyond the city, allowing for a wider conception of political philosophy to immerge. He was also able to make some contributions to democratic theory and thus has cemented him place alongside other, more famous names in History of Political Philosophy.         

St. Augustine

Ernest L. Fortin’s contribution to History of Political Philosophy focuses on St. Augustine, the first Christian philosopher included in the book, thus representing a significant shift in the book’s progress as it goes from the original Greek and Roman philosophers to the Christian and Jewish ones that would later take and expand upon the ideas first presented by the Greeks and the Romans. For Fortin, St. Augustine is an important figure in that shift as he was the first philosopher to deal comprehensively with the subject of civil society in the light of the changes brought about by a revealed religion. St. Augustine thus combines the bible with classical philosophy. Although I feel he is oversimplifying things a bit, one of the important points Fortin brings up is that Christianity is distinct from both Judaism and Islam in that it sought to incorporate philosophy into its own system rather than reject it entirely or treat it as an outsider with limited use. What this did was assure that though significant changes in society came about due to Christianity, with much of the old Roman and Greek culture being destroyed, philosophy was not one of those things, as it was not only not destroyed, it also thrived under these new conditions. For St. Augustine as well as those that came after him, philosophy was a tool in which people could gain the truths on which revelation did not speak. Furthermore, St. Augustine does not see philosophy and theology as being self-contained, but rather as two subjects in the same realm as each other. Ultimately, St. Augustine comes to the same conclusion on philosophy and faith that Cicero did on philosophy and order for St. Augustine realizes that an unchecked philosophy will eventually serve to undermine faith, so for him the goal of the Christian philosopher must write in a way as to satisfy the curious without undermining faith. Accordingly, his primary audience is a Christian one.

Though the commonly thought of interpretation of St. Augustine as a Platonist is correct, it is important to note that due to the difficulty in finding Plato’s authentic work at the time, he was forced to rely upon the works of others to know what Plato said. Despite this handicap, he did gain a firm understanding of what Plato argued, and much like Plato, St. Augustine sees humans as a social animal that would have sought community eve had the fall never occurred. For St. Augustine, civil society is a commonwealth that requires justice and peace. So important is justice in the eyes of St. Augustine, he considers right by justice to be a more important element of a just order that right by law. And because of this conception of the just city, St. Augustine was greatly frustrated with the inability to bring the just city into reality, even while he stayed within the classical conception of justice. As St. Augustine noted, cities were often more defined by injustice than justice. But rather than just write off the conception of the just city as something that would be nice but could never happen in reality as others had done before him, St. Augustine the fact that such injustices were allowed to occur inexcusable. St. Augustine’s conception of justice is heavily rooted in the idea of natural law, and this natural brings about harmony. But because of sin, this harmony has become disrupted, and as a result, men now desire dominion over other men. And while this does have some parallels to modern political theories, as I explain more fully in my essay The Proto-Libertarianism of St. Augustine, this also created a new conception of injustice, as unjust rule was now a form of rebellion. The fall of man plays a central role in St. Augustine’s thought as the fall required people to now look to God and the Church in order to attain justice.

Natural law is also a major part of St. Augustine’s work and it plays a major role in how he conceives that the city should function in regards to its laws. First, while natural law is universal, this does not mean there can be no variation of law between two just cities as temporal law can differ in regards to time and place and still be within the realm of justice. What this means is that democracy is a just city or the rule of one just man in a corrupt city are both examples of just laws. What does need to be noted though is that St. Augustine rejects the idea that temporal law can make people just for two major reasons. The first reason is that many crimes go unpunished, while the second reason is that temporal law, by its nature can only deal with the external affairs of humans, not the internal ones. Thus, it is quite possible that a man could obey just laws for an unjust reason and still remain unjust. Mere compliance with the law is not enough to make a man just. Also important in understanding St. Augustine’s vision of justice is eternal law, which is much like natural law, but unlike natural law, eternal law is also concerned with the afterlife. In accordance with his belief in justice, St. Augustine believes people are free to act justly or unjustly. Though free will and the traditional Christian conception of God have been seen as incompatible, for St. Augustine they are not, and free will simply means that people will their acts.

St. Augustine is also quite critical of the Roman Empire of his day as he sees the injustice Rome showed in dealing with other nations as stemming from their internal corruption as no nation can be externally just and internally unjust. Furthermore, Rome’s power was not the result of Roman justice as the Romans themselves commonly believed, but rather came about from God’s plan as by uniting the world under Roman rule, it would be easier for the Gospel to spread. Part of the Roman’s problems according to St. Augustine was that they had the wrong conception of what a “hero” was as he saw the martyrs as being more heroic that any Roman warrior. A further problem for Rome was that its religion had been corrupted and used by the rulers as a method of getting and keeping power. But even beyond that, St. Augustine sees polytheism as being ultimately doomed as it can only give people plausible lies and as such can never be fully rationalized. As a result of this, there will come a day when the people can no longer believe in polytheism.

Perhaps the most famous Augustinian idea is the “City of God”, which stems from the vision that humanity is divided into two cities, the City of God and the City of Man. Residence in these two cities are not defined by birth, but rather by action. One thing that is important to note that while there is certainly overlap, the City of God should not be seen as synonymous with the Church as there are some Church members not in the City of God, and likewise there are some non-Christians who are unknowingly in the City of God. It should also be noted that membership in the City of God does not negate other human social relations. This does however create a sharp distinction between spiritual and temporal authority.

St. Augustine also spent some time arguing against certain pagan writers who blamed Rome’s decline on the spread of Christianity. Against these writers, St. Augustine noted that Roman history had always been highly violent, and thus Christianity was not to blame. Another argument the pagans offered was the Christianity caused people to turn from the supposed glory of war, which St. Augustine responded by noting that Christianity does not negate people’s civic duty, and it is not war as a whole that Christians reject, but rather unjust war. St. Augustine further responds by noting that war is a condition of fallen man, which is a far less glorious conception of war than the one that was found in the pagan societies of the time.       

Western Civilization has been described as the marriage between Athens, Rome, and Jerusalem What this means is that Western Civilization ultimately rests on three pillars; Greek philosophy (Athens), Roman legal ideas (Rome), and the Christian religion (Jerusalem). It is almost impossible to conceive of the West without these three pillars. It was St. Augustine who was highly influential in laying down the work in which these three differing ideas could be synthesized, thus leading to the formation of what we now call “Western Civilization.” By doing this, St. Augustine assured that Greek philosophy, Roman legal ideas, and the Christian religion would not only survive, but also thrive in the new world brought about by the fall of the Western Roman Empire and the beginning of the Middle Ages, both events which occurred only a few years after his death.     

Marcus Tullius Cicero

James E. Holton’s contribution to History of Political Philosophy focuses on Marcus Tullius Cicero whose writings appear near the end of the first century BC in what is commonly thought of as being a “dark period” for philosophy, and indeed Holton readily admits that Cicero is generally poorly regarded for his own work, with many seeing it as mere justification for aristocracy. For most, his real lasting contribution to philosophy lies in his giving a detailed account of several schools of Greek philosophy, which assured these schools of thought would not be lost to the process of time. He is also well regarded for his use of rhetoric in the service of philosophy, for it was he who played a major role in bringing Greek philosophy to the Romans, who were, for the most part distrustful of philosophy due to its Greek origins.

            But as Holton notes, Cicero did more than simply sell the Romans on the merits of Greek thought, for Cicero noticed a highly troubling paradox in the heart of philosophy that could seriously undermine both the state and philosophy itself. Cicero noticed that philosophy tended to generate skepticism, and that skepticism could ultimately be dangerous to the very political order philosophy needs to flourish. Thus, philosophy had to be restrained in order to assure its ultimate survival and thus had to be careful not to undermine the existing political order and always had to keep in mind that even bad government was better than no government.

Similar to Plato, Cicero’s central works are entitled The Republic and The Laws and both are mostly dialogs of other’s speaking, discussing political matters, the major difference being that in Cicero’s works, Roman statesmen have the starring role. Though much of both these works have been lost, Holton is able to draw many important philosophical points from the surviving pieces. One of the major questions Cicero deals with in The Republic is if the active (practical/ political) life or the contemplative (philosophical) life was superior. On this question, Cicero says that contemplative life is ultimately impractical and further notes that virtue cannot exist in a vacuum. But with that being said, Cicero still does see some value in the contemplative life, as while the active life does produce more of a sense of duty, this ultimately has to remain limited, and as such, a duel approach is needed. Cicero’s duel approach can also be seen as a way of promoting continuity within the community, which can produce a more robust conception of stability. This stability for the community is important as much like Aristotle, Cicero sees man as a social animal that cannot exist in solitude, and thus the state is natural.

Though the state is natural, there are several types of regimes a state can be, which can be divided into three different categories based on the number of people who rule. First is the rule of one, which is characterized by affection, then there is the rule of the best, which is characterized by counsel/ wisdom, then finally there is the rule of all, which is characterized by liberty. It is important to note here that each form of government contains deficits and therefore the seeds of its own destruction. Following from this point, depraved counterparts for each type of government exists. For the rule of one, it is tyranny; for the rule of the best; it is oligarchy, while the depraved version of the rule by all is mob rule. As these types of governments are depraved, they cannot last long and are characterized by constant revolutions. What is important to note here though is that for Cicero, the movement towards depraved forms of government is natural, and there is nothing even the most able statesman can do to stop this decay, though he can temporarily delay it. The best way to delay this process according to Cicero is to make use of a mixed constitution, as it is able to draw from the strengths each type of government possesses while avoided the major weaknesses each government possesses, as even if one aspect of the government degenerates, the other aspects will still be able to preserve order. For Cicero, the Rome of his own day is evidence of this inevitable decline as it was sliding towards tyranny, a slide that would eventually cumulate in the fall of the Roman Republic and the establishment of the Roman Empire.

In The Laws, Cicero enquires about what would be the best regime. Plato did this as well, but there is an important distinction between Plato’s and Cicero’s thought on this subject. For Plato, questions on the best type of regime are rooted in justice, but Cicero shifts this to questions about the best type of regime being rooted in injustice. As a result, the best regime is no longer one that exists in our ideals, but rather it is the best type of regime that can be reasonably hoped to be attained. The Laws mostly centers on the debate between Philus, a young man and Laelius, an older and much more conservative man. For Philus, justice is not natural as if justice was natural; the idea of what justice was would be common to all men. Furthermore, Philus also argues that acting unjustly is a necessity as had Rome been held to the constraints of justice, it would not be an empire, but rather a small, impoverished village. Laelius responds by noting that is Philus’ ideas were to be taken seriously, it would end in disaster and that all, including states must be held to the demands of justice. Cicero, for his part should be seen as holding a position in-between Philus and Laelius. For Cicero, there is a very real tension between the demands of natural law and the demands of civil law, fully recognizing that the complete demands of natural law would render civil law impossible to perform. Ultimately then, what is needed to ease this tension is leaders with wisdom, as they can sort out this tension. Thus, for Cicero, leadership can be seen as requiring the temperance of both pure justice and pure reason.